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ABSTRACT: Balancing sustainability with equitable access to new technologies is a challenge 
for all health systems. For instance, potentially life-extending but expensive medicines, partic-
ularly in oncology, may offer only modest benefit near the end of life. The costs of these drugs 
are placing pressure on public and private payers, individual patients, and their families. The 
United Kingdom and Australia have established programs that require evidence of compara-
tive clinical and cost-effectiveness to inform decisions. This brief analyzes British, Australian, 
and German policies on coverage of such medicines. For Europe and Australia, the challenge 
is to manage the continuing pressure to pay for expensive medicines through tax- or social 
security-funded systems, without undermining core principles of equity and efficiency. For the 
United States, the challenge is to ensure fiscal sustainability of Medicare, Medicaid, and the 
private insurance market without restricting choice, especially as health reform extends access 
to more Americans.
                    
INTRODUCTION
Balancing sustainability and cost containment with equitable and timely access to 
effective new technologies is a challenge around the world. Expensive medicines  
that potentially extend life, particularly those used in oncology, are placing cost  
pressures on public and private payers, as well individual patients and their families.1 
To address these tensions, the United Kingdom, Australia, and Germany have  
well-established programs that require evidence of comparative clinical and, for 
Australia and the U.K., cost-effectiveness to inform resource allocation decisions. 
This issue brief compares U.K., Australian, and German policies on coverage of these 
medicines, particularly those that are not curative and offer modest increments in  
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median survival rates. Based on analyses of published  
policies, legislation, and grey literature from each of  
the three countries, as well as individual case studies  
and aggregate data on coverage decisions and spending, 
we discuss the methodological, evidential, and ethical 
challenges of using comparative effectiveness research  
to inform coverage decisions for end-of-life medicines. 
We identify insights for the United States; in particular, 
for the Patient-Centered Outcomes Research Institute 
that is charged with developing appropriate evidence  
to guide decision-makers across the various U.S. health 
care sectors.
Despite the significant structural and cultural dif-
ferences between the U.S. system and the U.K., German, 
and Australian systems, all four countries face similar 
challenges with respect to evidence-informed pharma-
ceutical policy. For Europe and Australia, the aim is to 
manage the burgeoning pressures to pay for expensive 
cancer drugs for patients with incurable diseases through 
a resource-constrained system funded through taxes or 
social security, without undermining the core principles 
of equity and efficiency. For the United States, it is about 
ensuring the fiscal sustainability of Medicare, Medicaid, 
and the private insurance market—especially as the 
implementation of the Affordable Care Act broadens 
access to more Americans—without restricting choice or 
causing a backlash from those who are well-insured or the 
health care industry. With prices escalating across devel-
oped markets and affordability an issue for U.S. insurers 
and national health system administrators,2,3 there is an 
ongoing battle to reconcile sustainability with access, 
equity, and industry policy.
THE U.K.’S NATIONAL HEALTH SERVICE: 
EXCEPTIONAL POLICIES AND PRICE 
NEGOTIATIONS
In the United Kingdom, a recent public debate has 
prompted the National Institute for Health and Clinical 
Excellence (NICE) to introduce a specific policy to guide 
decision-making around expensive, mainly oncologic 
medicines, by creating a mechanism that effectively allows 
its committees to approve seemingly cost-ineffective drugs 
where they are thought to extend life in terminally ill 
patients. This is known as end-of-life (EOL) guidance. 
In addition, the new U.K. coalition government has 
announced the establishment of a Cancer Drugs Fund 
to support access to any medicine an oncologist feels is 
clinically appropriate, thereby raising significant concerns 
around both costs and feasibility. The Fund would operate 
until the new value-based pricing policy is put in place in 
2014, which is intended to ensure all drugs launched in 
the U.K. market are priced in an appropriately cost-effec-
tive way and can be made available to all who need them. 
This section describes the three initiatives (EOL, Cancer 
Drugs Fund, and value-based pricing) and discusses their 
possible implications on access, equity, and overall costs. 
This is followed by a discussion of risk-sharing schemes 
(known as patient access schemes), a policy that allows 
NICE’s committees a third option in addition to a posi-
tive or negative adoption decision. 
NICE’s End-of-Life Guidance:  
Introducing Managed Flexibility
NICE was established in 1999 to reduce inappropriate 
variation, known as the “postcode lottery,” in access to 
treatments; accelerate the uptake of innovative treatments 
(mostly drugs) across the country, given the relatively 
conservative prescribing habits of British physicians; set 
nationwide, evidence-based clinical guidelines for profes-
sionals; and ensure resources are invested in the National 
Health Service (NHS) in the most cost-effective way.4
In August 2008, NICE’s technology appraisal 
committee, responsible for making recommendations 
to the NHS on the value of pharmaceuticals and other 
medical technologies, published draft guidance reject-
ing the use of Sutent for metastatic renal cancer because 
it was not cost-effective. In addition to Pfizer’s Sutent, 
the committee provisionally ruled against bevacizumab, 
sorafenib, and temsirolimus for the same indication. 
NICE estimated it would cost from £70,000 to £170,000 
(US$113,000 to $275,000) per patient per year to offer 
these drugs for an average life extension of no more than 
a few weeks. In March 2009, the guidance was partly 
reversed and NICE recommended “sunitinib as a first-
line treatment option for people with advanced and/
or metastatic renal cell carcinoma who are suitable for 
immunotherapy . . . .”5
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A great deal occurred in the interim. Following 
a very public debate in the press, repeated consulta-
tions on the individual drug submissions that included 
additional evidence from the manufacturers, a NICE 
Citizens’ Council recommending that disease severity 
be accounted for in coverage decisions,6 and two NICE 
Board meetings, NICE issued guidance to its own com-
mittees to change the way it evaluates drugs that extend 
life for terminally ill patients. This end-of-life (EOL) 
guidance was the conclusion of an almost 12-month 
debate to how the NHS could improve access to expen-
sive cancer drugs.7,8 NICE’s EOL guidance came as a 
response to a review commissioned by the U.K. The 
review was tasked to find ways for improving access 
to medicines through the tax-funded NHS without 
burdening patients with out-of-pocket contributions.9 
Responding to the review, NICE issued guidance to its 
committees to be more generous when evaluating clinical 
and cost-effectiveness when assessing “treatments licensed 
for terminal illnesses affecting small numbers of patients, 
which, although offering demonstrable survival benefits 
over current NHS practice, need a significantly higher 
share of NHS resources to pay for them than is normally 
the case for effective new treatments.”10 The criteria set 
forth in the EOL guidance (Exhibit 1) resulted in about 
a dozen drugs being reviewed from January 2009 to late 
2010, with half gaining “exceptional” approval, despite 
the fact that their incremental cost-effectiveness ratio 
was above NICE’s £20,000 to £30,000 (US$32,000 to 
$49,000) per quality-adjusted life year.11
The U.K.’s Cancer Drugs Fund:  
Coming Full Circle
The NICE EOL policy was not intended to ensure that 
all new treatments—particularly new cancer drugs—
could be covered by the NHS. Instead, the objective was 
to be able to show flexibility, and to take social value 
judgments into consideration, while still quantifying the 
opportunity cost of adoption decisions and sustaining 
the pressure on pharmaceutical manufacturers to produce 
credible value propositions for their products. As a result, 
NICE still rejected drugs such as sorafenib for advanced 
liver cancer and bevacizumab for first-line renal cancer. 
The pressure from patient groups and the pharmaceutical 
industry continued, as did the press coverage, and cancer 
treatment became an electoral campaign commitment for 
the opposition. In its manifesto, the Conservative Party 
promised to pay for all cancer drugs. The coalition plan 
for government, published in July 2010, states: “We will 
create a Cancer Drugs Fund to enable patients to access 
the cancer drugs their doctors think will help them.”12
The announcement of the Cancer Drugs Fund 
triggered both positive and negative reactions. While 
some patient groups and the drug industry welcomed the 
move, The Lancet speculated, “Presumably emergency 
funds for dementia and multiple sclerosis drugs will be 
announced in due course—anything else would be intel-
lectually indefensible.”13 Despite government’s reassur-
ances that the Fund did not undermine NICE and was 
part of a broader policy for improving access to drugs, 
some felt it did precisely that.14
Exhibit 1. NICE Criteria for Applying End-of-Life Guidance to  
Committee Decisions on Drugs
NICE’s EOL advice should be applied when all the criteria referred to below are satisfied:
• The treatment is indicated for patients with a short life expectancy, normally less than 24 months;
• There is sufficient evidence to indicate that the treatment offers an extension to life, normally of at least an 
additional three months, compared with current NHS treatment, and; 
• The patient population for which the treatment is licensed or otherwise indicated is small.
When applying the EOL guidance, NICE’s committees ought to:
• Be convinced of the robustness of the data;
• Quantify (and state) how much more the new drug has to be valued (compared with alternatives) to be 
deemed cost-effective by NICE’s conventional standards; and
• Recommend data collection in order to evaluate the true survival benefit conferred by the drug.
Source: Authors’ analysis.
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Less than a year following its launch, two major 
practical problems became apparent. One was estimat-
ing the magnitude of funding necessary to cover all 
cancer drugs rejected by NICE, the other was offering all 
patients eligible to benefit from it equal access across the 
country. On the former, government relied on, among 
others, estimates from the Rarer Cancers Forum,15 sug-
gesting that £200 million (US$324 million) per year 
would be enough to cover all cancer drugs that NICE 
had not approved on the grounds of inadequate cost-
effectiveness. Starting with £50 million (US$81 million) 
for part of 2010, the Fund has grown to £200 million 
per year from 2011 onwards. However, £200 million is 
unlikely to be enough. Bevacizumab for bowel cancer 
(rejected by NICE in December 2010) would take up 
almost 70 percent of the Fund’s annual budget, or £135 
million (US$219 million) per year for England alone.16 
The second problem is administering the Fund in an 
equitable fashion. Lack of centralized guidance is, once 
again, resulting in practice variations and is triggering 
complaints from professionals and patients.
In addition to the practical problems of getting 
the size and disbursement right across the country, the 
ethical basis for singling out cancer as distinct from the 
many other severe end-of-life conditions is unclear. The 
government’s impact assessment to accompany the new 
policy noted that “no evidence has been found for pri-
oritizing cancer above other severe conditions, or for pri-
oritizing drug treatments above any other interventions 
for cancer.”17
PATIENT ACCESS SCHEMES AND VALUE-
BASED PRICING: CAN THEY IMPROVE 
PATIENTS’ ACCESS TO NEW DRUGS?
While NICE cannot negotiate prices, it has been increas-
ingly using price deals with manufacturers to improve 
patients’ access to technologies, often coupled with the 
application of EOL guidance.18 Such deals, formalized as 
patient access schemes, effectively reduce the cost of the 
drug to the NHS without affecting the list price of new 
drugs launched in the U.K. market.19 The latter is impor-
tant as, despite the U.K. market’s relatively small size (3% 
of the global pharmaceutical market), NHS prices are 
internationally referenced by a quarter of the global mar-
ket.20 Patient access schemes began as risk-sharing mecha-
nisms, with the first being for Velcade (bortezomib), a 
drug for multiple myeloma.21 In 2007, the manufacturer 
and NICE agreed to an arrangement that would ensure 
access for NHS patients and at the same time satisfy 
NICE’s requirements for evidence of comparative clinical 
and cost-effectiveness prior to diffusion. The company 
committed to reimbursing NHS providers if the drug 
did not work (based on a reliable test of response to treat-
ment) and the NHS promised to pay for the drug for all 
those patients that did respond. The response threshold 
was negotiated and the scheme launched. Since then, 
over 20 technologies, mostly expensive pharmaceuticals, 
have been made available to the NHS through similar 
programs. Increasingly, these are now being used as a 
means of negotiating price reductions through capping 
the overall number of treatment cycles or treatment costs 
to those of the next best alternative, effectively leading to 
a reduction in prices and more favorable incremental cost-
effectiveness ratios. Nevertheless, despite the advent of 
patient access schemes and the EOL policy, NICE is still 
unable to recommend access for around 30 percent of the 
cancer drugs it reviews on grounds of inadequate clinical 
or cost-effectiveness.22
To improve access to expensive new medicines, the 
new government has announced radical reforms in the 
way pharmaceuticals are priced and launched in the U.K. 
Starting in 2014, the government will negotiate prices of 
all new drugs before they can enter the U.K. market. In 
addition to NICE’s analysis of comparative clinical and 
cost-effectiveness, the negotiation will consider broader 
societal benefits, disease severity, and the degree of inno-
vation represented by the new therapy.23,24 The govern-
ment is “determined to create a system that gives patients 
access to the most effective medicines . . . too often, the 
NHS has been in the position of either having to pay 
high prices that are not always justified by the benefits of 
a new medicine, or having to restrict access . . . . There 
must be a much closer link between the price the NHS 
pays and the value that a medicine delivers.”25
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Reorganization of the NHS:  
NICE’s Future Role
The United Kingdom is committed to an NHS that is 
free at the point of delivery, based on need and not the 
ability to pay. Although the NHS is currently undergo-
ing one of its most radical reorganizations since it was 
established in 1948, the role of NICE in ensuring quality, 
efficiency, and equitable access has been reinforced by 
the current government. Beginning in 2012, NICE will 
assume responsibility for setting standards in social care 
(e.g., home care for the elderly), and it is likely to have a 
broader role in informing price-setting for pharmaceu-
ticals from 2014. In addition, primary legislation will 
reestablish the organization as accountable to Parliament 
rather than to the Department of Health from 2012. 
Perhaps most important, NICE is now responsible for 
setting quality standards that will drive purchasing and 
delivery of services, as well as pay-for-performance in pri-
mary and secondary care and provider regulation.26
END-OF-LIFE DRUGS AND DRUGS FOR 
RARE DISEASES IN AUSTRALIA
Australians have benefited from universal access to subsi-
dized prescription medicines since 1948. The Australian 
Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme (PBS) is a federal gov-
ernment program that operates under the umbrella of the 
National Medicines Policy, which aims to provide “timely 
access to the medicines that Australians need, at a cost 
individuals and the community can afford.”27 Subsidized 
medicines are listed on a national formulary, with inclu-
sion processes intended to support affordable, equitable 
access to prescription medicines and ensure value for 
Australian taxpayers, and not necessarily as a mechanism 
for cost containment.
The inclusion of a drug on the national formulary 
is dependent on a positive recommendation from the 
Pharmaceutical Benefits Advisory Committee (PBAC), 
which considers not only the comparative effectiveness of 
proposed drugs but also their comparative cost-effective-
ness. The PBAC is a statutory, independent, expert com-
mittee established under the National Health Act of 1953 
to make recommendations to the Minister for Health 
and Ageing on which medicines should be included on 
the schedule of pharmaceutical benefits and any condi-
tions that should apply. A 1987 amendment to the Act 
required PBAC to take into account the effectiveness and 
cost of a medicine compared with other drug or nondrug 
therapies when considering listing a new medicine on the 
formulary.28 As a result, a medicine that is more costly 
than other available treatments is generally only recom-
mended for subsidy if it represents a clinically significant 
improvement in effectiveness or reduction in toxicity.29
While the recommendations of the PBAC are 
advisory only, and the final listing decision remains with 
the Minister for Health and Ageing,30 the Minister may 
decline a listing recommendation made by the PBAC, 
but cannot add a medicine to the PBS formulary in the 
absence of a positive recommendation from the commit-
tee. Here we describe some of the flexibilities within the 
PBS listing decision-making processes and look at other 
programs established within Australia to address excep-
tional circumstances such as end-of-life treatments and 
expensive drugs for rare, life-threatening diseases.
PBAC Decision-Making
While comparative cost-effectiveness is an essential pre-
requisite for listing, it is not the sole criterion nor does 
PBAC apply a fixed cost-effectiveness threshold. As such, 
it is able to be both more and less flexible than the U.K.’s 
NICE. The PBAC applies a similar decision-making 
paradigm to all medicines irrespective of the therapeutic 
area, so no particular significance is attached to an oncol-
ogy or other “end-of-life” medicine. Rather, in consider-
ing each submission, the committee weighs a range of 
relevant factors in addition to incremental cost-effective-
ness. These factors are not weighted equally but by their 
relative importance in different situations, making it 
impossible to quantify the importance of any particular 
factor. The factors are:
•	 clinical need, particularly for conditions for which 
there are no, or few, treatment options;
•	 the extent to which a proposed treatment repre-
sents a clinically meaningful advance in therapy;
•	 the degree of uncertainty in the estimate of incre-
mental cost-effectiveness;
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•	 the potential total cost to the PBS or government 
health budgets;
•	 the scope for use of the drug beyond any restric-
tion for subsidy, and the extent to which a restric-
tion can be constructed that satisfactorily distin-
guishes use that is acceptably cost-effective from 
use that is not cost-effective;
•	 the potential for adverse outcomes arising from 
availability with subsidy (e.g., PBAC may restrict 
subsidized use of certain antibiotics to limit the 
development of resistant organisms);
•	 the affordability of the medicine to the patient in 
the absence of a subsidy; and
•	 the “rule of rescue”—reserved for drugs for serious 
or fatal diseases for which no other treatments are 
available.
The Rule of Rescue
It is this last factor—the so-called “rule of rescue”—
through which the PBAC may apply some additional 
flexibility when considering an end-of-life drug. However, 
it is applied rarely; it is reserved strictly for medicines for 
life-threatening conditions for which there is no other 
effective treatment available in Australia, either subsi-
dized or unsubsidized (see Exhibit 2). The rule of rescue 
supplements, rather than supplants, the consideration of 
comparative cost-effectiveness. A decision on whether the 
rule is relevant is taken only if PBAC is inclined to reject 
a submission on comparative cost-effectiveness grounds. 
In this situation, if PBAC concludes that the rule is rel-
evant, it will then consider whether it is sufficiently influ-
ential to reverse the decision not to recommend listing.
Restricted Indications
As the PBAC continues to grapple with expensive 
end-of-life drugs, listing recommendations may be 
accompanied by closely specified restrictions and, at 
times, “stepped-therapy”31 requirements or treatment 
algorithms. These are imposed because drugs either lack 
robust evidence of a clinically important additional ben-
efit over existing therapies or because the incremental 
costs of obtaining those benefits mean that the drugs 
are cost-effective in only a defined group of patients. 
The PBAC, in attempting to facilitate access and ensure 
taxpayer value, may at times recommend that subsidized 
access be limited to so-called “last-line” therapy (i.e., 
treatments that are reserved for circumstances where all 
alternative therapies are unsuitable or have not proven 
successful for an individual patient); in other cases, it 
may recommend that access be highly targeted, or, in a 
small number of cases, that subsidized therapy be con-
tinued only for patients who demonstrate a predefined 
response to the treatment. 
Risk-Sharing Arrangements
The PBS uses a variety of risk-sharing arrangements 
(RSAs), which are similar to the U.K.’s patient access 
schemes.32 One example of an RSA is a rebate paid to 
government by the manufacturer for PBS’s expenditures 
on a particular drug exceeding an agreed-upon annual 
cap. In some cases a pooled annual sales cap may be 
established for a group of drugs used to treat a particular 
condition, with rebates proportional to market share. 
Price–volume agreements (the very first RSAs) provide 
rebates or price reductions based on the price of an alter-
native, cheaper medicine when use exceeds the estimate 
of the population in whom the medicine is considered to 
Exhibit 2. PBAC Guidance on the Application of the “Rule of Rescue”
Four factors, which apply in exceptional circumstances, are particularly influential in favor of listing. When all four 
factors apply concurrently, this is called the “rule of rescue.”
• No pharmacological or nonpharmacological alternative exists in Australia to treat patients with the medical 
condition;
• The medical condition is severe, progressive, and expected to lead to premature death;
• The medical condition applies to only a very small number of patients; and
• The proposed drug provides a worthwhile clinical improvement sufficient to qualify as a rescue from the 
medical condition.
Source: Authors’ analysis.
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be cost-effective and when it is difficult to restrict use to a 
particular subpopulation.
Although dispensed prices for PBS medicines and 
other formulary information are in the public domain, 
RSAs may also reduce the actual price paid by the PBS 
program without affecting the published dispensed price 
of a drug. A number of medicines listed on the PBS for-
mulary carry the notation that “special pricing arrange-
ments apply,” indicating that the list price is at variance 
with the true transaction cost. This improves value for 
money but reduces transparency in pricing.
Herceptin: A Special Case
The case of Herceptin (trastuzumab) reflects a singularly 
awkward episode in the PBAC’s history. In Australia, 
regulatory approval of Herceptin in 2000 was imme-
diately followed by extensive campaigning by patient 
groups in favor of subsidized access through listing on the 
PBS—for what was then one of the most expensive medi-
cines ever considered for listing. In assessing the spon-
sor’s application in 2001, the PBAC did not consider the 
drug to be sufficiently cost-effective for the treatment 
of metastatic breast cancer and rejected the application. 
Throughout 2001, interest groups heavily lobbied the 
prime minister, minister for health, and other key poli-
ticians, as well as PBAC, to support PBS listing of the 
drug. This led to pre-election commitments from both 
major political parties to subsidize Herceptin.
However, as it was unable to list the medicine 
on the PBS in the absence of a positive recommenda-
tion from the PBAC, the government created a separate, 
taxpayer-funded Herceptin program outside the PBS,33 
which continues today. Despite being PBS-listed for 
early-stage breast cancer in 2006, subsidized access to 
Herceptin in advanced metastatic disease remains limited 
to this special program—an arrangement that has not, 
to date, been repeated. Indeed, the ongoing viability and 
credibility of the PBAC and PBS processes might argu-
ably be called into question were it to occur again, at least 
in the absence of a formal public consultation and debate 
about social values and expenditure priorities.
The Life Saving Drugs Program
Although this brief is focused on end-of-life medicines, 
it is also relevant to mention other mechanisms that exist 
to manage access to extremely high-cost medicines in 
Australia. The Life Saving Drugs Program (LSDP) is a 
small, fixed appropriation funded by the Australian gov-
ernment established outside the PBS that provides free 
access for eligible patients to certain expensive and life-
saving drugs for rare, serious, and usually life-threatening 
medical conditions. Drugs included in the LSDP must be 
shown to be effective in extending the lifespan of patients 
suffering from life-threatening diseases for which there 
are no other suitable, cost-effective therapies available. 
At the present time, the LSDP funds treatment for eight 
drugs and around 180 patients. Seven of the drugs are for 
the treatment of five lysosomal storage disorders, which 
are rare inherited enzyme deficiencies; the remaining 
therapy is for the treatment of the rare disorder, paroxys-
mal nocturnal hemoglobinuria.
The criteria for consideration of the addition 
of a drug to the LSDP do not place any restrictions on 
the range of conditions to be treated or the types of 
pharmaceutical therapies (Exhibit 3). The government 
requires applications be submitted initially to the PBAC. 
The PBAC must consider the evidence presented by the 
medicine’s sponsor, conclude that the medicine is not 
cost-effective (and therefore not suitable for listing on the 
PBS), and then find that it meets the LSDP program cri-
teria. Positive findings are then considered for funding by 
the government on a case-by-case basis.
Political Pragmatism or Compassionate 
Exceptionalism?
Unlike the United Kingdom, Australia has not had an 
extensive public or media debate on expensive lifesav-
ing drugs or end-of-life therapies. Indeed, to date there 
has been no formal debate on social value judgments 
and their role in PBAC decision-making. From time to 
time, awareness of PBAC’s consideration of a particular 
therapy will generate interest. Previous decisions not 
to recommend drugs such as Alimta (pemetrexed) for 
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mesothelioma and Soliris (ecaluzimab) for paroxysmal 
nocturnal hemoglobinuria attracted both media and pub-
lic interest, mainly focusing on the plight of individual 
sufferers and their families. But, rarely, if ever, is the price 
of a drug questioned, or its effectiveness, which may be 
exaggerated in media reports, and until very recently 
there has been almost no discussion of the opportunity 
costs of expensive therapies. Programs like the LSDP are 
arguably challenging to reconcile with the equity objec-
tive of the National Medicines Policy. As the LSDP con-
tinues to expand, that debate becomes further overdue.
In February 2011, the federal government 
announced that to return the budget to surplus as quickly 
as possible, no new drugs would be added to the PBS 
until 2013, irrespective of the recommendations of the 
PBAC. Moreover, rather than limiting its consideration 
to only those drugs with an expected net cost of more 
than AUD10 million per year, every drug recommended 
for listing by the PBAC would henceforth be subject to 
Cabinet scrutiny.34 Not surprisingly, this was met with 
significant criticism from the pharmaceutical industry, 
providers, and patients.
In a special meeting with the Consumers Health 
Forum on April 29, 2011, the then Minister for Health 
and Ageing stated that “government recognizes and val-
ues the role of PBAC in recommending new PBS listings 
to government” but, perhaps for the first time, stressed 
issues of opportunity cost and competing priorities in 
noting that it is “government’s responsibility to decide 
whether to list a new drug, taking into account other pri-
orities across the health portfolio and fiscal circumstances 
across government . . . [B]udgets must add up and 
choices must be made . . . I truly struggle to understand 
how people fail to recognize that these difficult choices 
have to be made . . . just because a drug is proven to be 
clinically and cost-effective, doesn’t mean it’s the most 
urgent or pressing way to spend finite taxpayer money.”35
Despite this very clear articulation of issues of 
opportunity cost, objections to the decision to defer new 
listings persisted. On September 30, 2011, the govern-
ment announced that as a result of budgetary savings 
generated by price reductions on certain medicines, it was 
able to reconsider the earlier decision and would list 48 
new medicines on the PBS from December 1, 2011, and 
also committed to not defer listing of any drugs costing 
less than AUD10 million a year over the coming year.36 
POLICIES FOR ENHANCING ACCESS TO 
MEDICINES IN THE UNITED KINGDOM AND 
AUSTRALIA: PERCEPTIONS AND IMPACT
There are various policies, currently in place or under 
consultation, for enhancing access to pharmaceuticals, 
Exhibit 3. Criteria for the Inclusion of a Medicine on the Life Saving Drugs Program
1.  A rare but clinically definable disease for which the drug is regarded as a proven therapeutic modality. 
2.  The disease is associated with significant shortening of expected lifespan and there is evidence to expect 
this will be extended by use of the drug.
3.  A patient with the disease can be identified with reasonable diagnostic precision.
4.  The patient should not be suffering from other medical conditions that might compromise treatment 
effectiveness.
5.  The drug must be accepted as clinically effective, but rejected for Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme (PBS) 
listing because it fails to meet the required cost-effectiveness criteria.
6.  No alternative is available that can be used as a lifesaving treatment.
7.  No alternative therapeutic modality (e.g., surgery, radiotherapy) is recognized as a suitable and cost-
effective treatment for the condition.
8.  The cost of the drug is an unreasonable financial burden on the patient.
9.  The patient must be an Australian resident who qualifies for Medicare.
10.  Where required, the patient must also satisfy any other specific criteria that may relate to a particular 
disease.
Source: Authors’ analysis. 
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particularly expensive oncologic and other specialized 
drugs, in the United Kingdom and Australia, in addition 
to well-established policy interventions at the institu-
tional level (i.e., NICE in the U.K. and PBAC/PBS in 
Australia). Most of these policies tend to deal with the 
exceptions rather than the bulk of new drugs entering 
these countries’ markets, which are handled by NICE 
and PBAC through conventional processes. In addition, 
most of these policies (e.g., Cancer Drugs Fund, EOL 
guidance) are relatively new, covering only a handful of 
drugs, and their impact on costs and access for eligible 
patients have not been systematically evaluated. 
GERMANY: AN END TO  
UNCONTROLLED PRICES
The Legal Framework in Germany:  
The Situation So Far 
The German social code asserts that anyone who needs 
a treatment is entitled to receive it. This has been made 
particularly clear by a high court decision in 200537 
involving an appeal by a patient suffering from Duchenne 
muscular dystrophy who was denied an unconventional 
bioresonance treatment by his statutory health insurance 
(SHI) fund. The court decreed that treatment in the case 
of a life-threatening disease is an essential part of health 
care and that SHI funds must pay for it. This judgment 
implied that any treatment a patient requested would have 
to be made available, provided there is at least a remote 
chance of cure or discernible improvement in the course 
of the disease. However, the court qualified its ruling: “A 
suggestion that a clinical effect might be attained for an 
individual can be based on the applicant’s health status 
compared to other patients with the same disease who 
have not yet received the treatment in question, and com-
pared to other patients with the same disease who have 
received the treatment in question.” This makes it clear 
that the court would expect some evidence to substantiate 
the potential benefit of the treatment.
In Germany, cancer drugs—like all other medi-
cines—have until now been reimbursed at the prices 
proposed by their manufacturers. Drugs are covered 
from market launch for the 90 percent of the population 
participating in SHI. The remaining 10 percent are cov-
ered by private health plans because of their employment 
status (i.e., self-employed) or income (gross income above 
€50,000 per year, or US$70,663).38 These individuals are 
reimbursed for drugs by these private plans. Decisions as 
to whether a service should be included in the catalogue 
of reimbursed services are made by the Federal Joint 
Committee (FJC). The FJC is a self-governing board 
comprising representatives of the national associations of 
SHI physicians who practice privately in an ambulatory 
setting, hospitals, SHI funds, and nonvoting patient rep-
resentatives.39 It is the responsibility of the FJC to estab-
lish reference pricing groups for drugs and drug classes.40
Reference Pricing in Germany
The reference-pricing model was first introduced into 
the SHI system in 1989. The reference price is the 
maximum reimbursable price that the SHI is willing 
to pay; if a drug or a device subject to reference pricing 
is more expensive than the reference price, either the 
manufacturer must lower the price or the patients will 
have to pay the difference out-of-pocket. In 2004, the 
FJC decided to include the patented lipid-lowering drug 
atorvastatin in a reference-pricing group with cheaper, 
off-patent products of the same drug class, such as simv-
astatin.41 This was the first of what is known as a “jumbo 
reference-price group.” Since then, three further jumbo 
groups have been established: angiotensin II receptor 
antagonists, selective 5–HT1B/1D/1F–receptor antago-
nists, and proton pump inhibitors. 
FJC defines groups of drugs for reference-pricing 
purposes. A minimum of three drugs must be available 
on the market to initiate one of three different levels  
of reference-pricing groups: 1) same chemical agent,  
2) pharmacologically comparable chemical agents with 
similar therapeutic effect, and 3) different chemical 
agents with the same therapeutic effect including com-
binations of drugs. As a next step, the national associa-
tion of SHI funds sets the reference price for each of the 
groups following legal guidance as laid out in Germany‘s 
Social Code Book V. Prices are published four times 
a year by the Deutsches Institut für Medizinisches 
Information und Dokumentation.42 Pfizer’s Norvasc 
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5mg, 30-pill pack, currently costs €27.17. A patient 
asking for the brand would have to pay the difference 
of €15.81 over the reference price. Yet, there are also 
products below the fix reference price, for instance 
Lansoprazol ABZ 30mg, 98-pill pack, is at €33.83 more 
than €20 below the reference price applicable to the size 
and dosage of this drug.
The Institute for Quality and Efficiency  
in Health Care
In 2004, the Institute for Quality and Efficiency in 
Health Care (IQWiG), modeled after the U.K.’s NICE, 
was established43,44 by the then Socialist and Green party 
coalition government. Over time, IQWiG has become 
a highly valued and respected source for the impartial 
compilation of scientific evidence for the FJC to address 
questions needed to steer the SHI system. Transparency is 
guaranteed as both experts and stakeholders are consulted 
at various stages. IQWiG makes recommendations that 
are not binding on the FJC. During the first few years, 
reports were limited to benefit assessment in accordance 
with the principles of evidence-based medicine—in 
effect providing comparative effectiveness research infor-
mation. Currently, IQWiG is working on its first two 
commissions for full health economic analyses, using an 
approach methodologically different to those adopted in 
the U.K. and Australia. The evaluations focus on antide-
pressants45 and the use of clopidogrel in acute coronary 
syndromes and peripheral arterial disease.46
The New German Pharmaceutical  
Pricing Law
As of January 1, 2011, under AMNOG (an act to 
reorganize the drug market), all new drugs—with two 
exceptions specified below—must be assessed to deter-
mine their additional benefits over drugs for the same 
indication or therapeutic area prior to being launched in 
the German market. Drugs already in the market may 
be assessed if FJC requests an evaluation. The benefit 
assessment, which is based on a dossier submitted by the 
manufacturer at market entry, will inform the classifica-
tion of the new drugs into six different groups: 1) major 
added benefit, 2) considerable added benefit, 3) minor 
added benefit, 4) unquantifiable added benefit, 5) no 
added benefit, and 6) less benefit.
Under the classification system, if a drug shows 
additional clinical benefit, there will be negotiations on 
the price between the association of SHI funds and the 
manufacturer. Where the drug does not show additional 
benefit, it will be put into a reference-pricing group or 
will only be reimbursed at the price of a cheaper compar-
ator drug. Orphan drugs for rare diseases and conditions, 
which may include oncology and end-of-life drugs, are 
exempt from the early benefit assessment if annual sales 
of the drug in the preceding 12 months do not exceed 
€50 million (US$71 million).
If IQWiG’s assessment shows additional benefit, 
and FJC agrees in its appraisal, the National Association 
of SHI funds47 and the manufacturer will go into nego-
tiations over a price. Any negotiated price will be binding 
for all German SHI funds. For the first time in Germany, 
the outcome will also extend to private health funds. 
Individual funds may also negotiate further discounts 
or rebates with manufacturers. Should the two negotiat-
ing parties not come to an agreement within six months 
of FJC’s decision on additional benefit, a central board 
of arbitration will determine a rebate based on interna-
tional prices. Nonetheless, the official list price that the 
manufacturers set at the time of market entry remains the 
reimbursement price until one of the price negotiation 
processes described above has been concluded. Moreover, 
the official list price will not be modified. As a result, 
other European countries cannot rely on a lower German 
list price in their negotiations or when applying external 
reference pricing.48
Benefit Assessment of Drugs:  
Choosing Outcome Measures
IQWiG relies strictly on patient outcomes—such as 
effects on mortality, morbidity, and quality of life—in 
its benefit assessments, and avoids unvalidated or inad-
equately validated surrogate measures.49 However, with 
the AMNOG law, surrogate measures may be used 
in dossiers as the duration of studies to support early 
market access do not always allow for patient outcomes 
to be measured. As a result, in August 2010, the FJC 
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commissioned IQWiG to undertake a rapid review of 
the validity of surrogate endpoints in cancer treatment. 
IQWiG’s report presented an assessment of best practice 
in surrogate endpoint validation.50 The report considered 
breast and colon cancer studies and concluded that the 
validity of surrogate measures such as disease-free survival 
remains unclear for both types of cancer mainly as there 
was not sufficient correlation between effects on disease-
free or progression-free survival and overall survival. 51 
It is currently being considered by the FJC to inform its 
understanding of how surrogate endpoints may be used 
in the benefit assessment of oncology drugs.
In regard to dementia,52 IQWiG has applied the 
concept of a minimally important difference to distin-
guish between treatment differences on scales that are 
statistically significant but clinically unimportant or 
irrelevant. Applying this concept to binary outcomes, for 
example, in oncology, this could mean that a drug that 
creates a statistically significant but small gain in average 
overall may be considered to have little clinical relevance. 
However, at present, with regard to cancer drugs, IQWiG 
considers any statistically significant gain in average over-
all survival as added benefit. Nevertheless, IQWiG could 
downgrade the level of added benefit of an oncologic 
drug given, for instance, a considerable decrease in qual-
ity of life that results from the therapy.
Rationing, Prioritization, and  
Efficiency Gaps
A vigorous ethical debate has been taking place over the 
last two years in Germany about what the health care sys-
tem ought to make available and for whom. Stakeholders’ 
motives vary. Some physicians want to reduce the bas-
ket of SHI-covered services to increase their incomes 
through services that they can offer and for which they 
can charge a premium. Some ethicists and lawyers want 
to raise awareness that scarce resources need to be dis-
tributed according to ethically sound principles that are 
also consistent with constitutional principles. A number 
of nationwide research projects have been instigated and 
various meetings and conferences convened, raising ques-
tions about oncology and end-of-life drugs. What should 
be considered a relevant effect of a drug? Who should 
judge whether the effect is relevant, the patients or the 
public? Should the relevance of an effect be determined 
by absolute or relative prolongation of survival? Does the 
FJC have a legal right to make these decisions under con-
stitutional law? Other stakeholders view the entire direc-
tion of the debate as a misstep, citing more pressing and 
less contentious opportunities for gaining greater effi-
ciency. These include: excluding from the reimbursement 
package treatments for which there is no proof of benefit 
according to criteria of evidence-based medicine, reduc-
ing the number of hospital beds, and revising regulations 
around inpatient and outpatient care that currently give 
rise to duplication and waste.
While the United Kingdom and Australia have 
well-established mechanisms for using comparative 
clinical and cost-effectiveness to inform technology 
adoption, Germany has only recently started to move 
in this direction, through both institutional and legal 
reforms. Germany is still searching for solutions that 
are transparent, efficient, and respectful of prevailing 
ethical values and legal standards, and of the country’s 
historical legacy.
EMERGING THEMES: SHARED 
CHALLENGES AND INTERNATIONAL 
APPROACHES
In 2009, discussing the clinical effectiveness and cost 
of new cancer treatments, Fojo and Grady53 estimated 
that if “a survival advantage of 1.2 months is worth 
$80,000, and by extrapolation survival of one year 
to be valued at $800,000, we would need $440 bil-
lion annually—100 times the budget of the National 
Cancer Institute—to extend by one year the life of the 
550,000 Americans who die of cancer annually. And no 
one would be cured.” Specialty drug costs are growing 
in the UnitedStates, as they are in Europe and Australia 
(Exhibit 4). However, in the U.S., rising costs often 
lead to cost-shifting to patients and their families either 
through premium increases, higher copayments, or 
both.54,55,56 Recent attempts by the Obama administra-
tion to introduce comparative effectiveness research as a 
means of informing clinical and policy decisions, albeit 
in a very passive and voluntary fashion, have been met 
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with resistance. Moreover, any hint of the Medicare 
Independent Payment Advisory Board considering prices 
in the context of containing overall health expenditure or 
of Medicare using its negotiating power when purchasing 
pharmaceuticals have had an equally hostile reception.57
Balancing access to needed medicines against 
escalating costs is one of the most challenging tasks 
in health care reform. The continually evolving phar-
maceutical pricing and reimbursement policies of the 
United Kingdom, Germany, and Australia, are intended 
to help bridge that balance. In the U.K. and Australia, 
value-for-money remains at the heart of policymak-
ing, especially in the current financial climate, and it 
is becoming increasingly important in Germany, one 
of Europe’s more generous health care systems (Exhibit 
5). In the U.K., nearly 12 years after it was established, 
NICE is seen by government—as well as the drug 
industry, patients, and professionals—as crucial to 
maintaining the quality and sustainability of the sys-
tem. EOL guidance, the Cancer Drugs Fund, and the 
value-based pricing proposals all consider costs and evi-
dence and are being broadly and publicly consulted and 
debated before they are implemented. In Australia, the 
PBAC enjoys political and popular support, and similar 
methods of health technology assessment are applied to 
other health care interventions such as vaccines, medical 
devices, and diagnostics.
Despite the differences among countries—with 
Germany providing a more generous package and 
applying a different disease-specific scope for economic 
analyses—a number of common emerging themes can 
be identified:
•	 Irrespective of the funding mechanism (social 
insurance or tax-based), all three countries view 
access to medicines as an entitlement for their 
populations; in doing so they find it legitimate to 
limit cost-shifting to patients to some degree, as 
they include new medicines on their pharmaceuti-
cal formularies.
•	 All three countries have developed explicit mecha-
nisms for making listing and reimbursement 
decisions based on evidence of comparative clini-
cal and cost-effectiveness, notwithstanding that 
economic evaluation has only recently been intro-
duced in the German system.
•	 All three systems struggle with the cost of some 
specialized drugs, especially oncology drugs for 
patients with advanced disease. In response, they 
have developed exceptional mechanisms, which 
include special pricing, risk-sharing arrangements, 
and tailored coverage determinations to facilitate 
access while considering value-for-money and 
negotiating prices based on evidence of compara-
tive effectiveness.
•	 Value-for-money in the health system is an accept-
able principle underpinning decision-making in 
all three countries.
Exhibit 4. Per Capita Spending on Pharmaceuticals in the United Kingdom, Germany, 
Australia, and the United States, 2000 and 2008
U.K. Germany Australia U.S.
2000 2008 2000 2008 2000 2008 2000 2008
Per capita spending on 
pharmaceuticals [US$ PPP] 259.8 381.4 362.2 594.2 335.5 502.8 540.3 919.1
Growth [%] 46.81 64.1 49.87 70.11
Percentage of total government 
health expenditure 14.2 11.6 13.6 15.0 14.8 14.6 11.3 11.9
Note: US$ PPP = U.S. dollar purchasing power parity, an estimate of the exchange rate required to equalize the purchasing power of different currencies, given the prices of 
goods and services in the coutries concerned.
Source: 2011 OECD Health Data, http://www.oecd.org/document/16/0,3746,en_2649_34631_2085200_1_1_1_1,00.html.
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Exhibit 5. Overview of the Three Systems
Attribute Australia Germany United Kingdom
Percentage of GDP 
spent on health (2008)*
~ 8.7% ~ 10.7% ~ 8.8%
Percentage of deficit in 
health budget
N/A Differs from year to year, 
with both surpluses and 
deficits in various years.
0%. The NHS is required 
statutorily to break even.
Funding source General taxation and 
Medicare levy
Contributions from 
employers and employees in 
the SHI scheme
General taxation
Percentage of total 
health expenditures on 
pharmaceuticals (2008)*
~ 14.6% ~ 15.1% ~ 11.6% 
National (or regional) 
mechanism for 
assessing the 
comparative clinical 
and cost-effectiveness 
of new medicines
Pharmaceutical Benefits 
Advisory Committee 
responsible for assessing 
comparative cost-
effectiveness and 
recommending medicines 
that should be subsidized.
Federal Joint Committee 
or Institute for Quality 
and Efficiency in Health 
Care responsible for 
assessing the comparative 
effectiveness of new 
pharmaceuticals within an 
early benefit assessment.
National Institute for Health 
and Clinical Excellence 
(NICE) responsible for 
assessing comparative 
clinical and cost-effective-
ness for all major new 
molecular entities or major 
new indications launched in 
the NHS.
Mechanism for pricing 
and reimbursement
Reimbursement subject 
to determination of cost-
effectiveness. Prices also 
subject to negotiation and 
risk-sharing agreements. 
Free pricing of private 
prescriptions.
Currently, free, company-
set pricing in the first year 
after market launch, while 
manufacturer and National 
Association of Statutory 
Health Insurance Funds 
negotiate final price based 
on early benefit assessment. 
Currently, free company-set 
pricing. Some indirect price 
negotiation through NICE 
Patient Access Schemes. 
Local price–volume 
agreements with providers. 
Copayment levels Two levels of fixed 
copayments; up to 
AUD34.20** per item for 
general beneficiaries, 
AUD5.60 per item for 
concessional beneficiaries 
(2011) with caps to protect 
against catastrophic 
expense. 
10% copayment to max 
of €10 (US$14). Patients 
eligible for exemption if the 
copayment reaches 2% of 
the annual gross income 
(1% for chronically ill).
~£7 (US$11) per 
prescription. ~85% of 
patients eligible for 
exemption because of 
age, chronic disease, 
employment status, etc.
Mechanism for 
coverage/listing 
decisions
Positive list. Addition to the 
formulary only possible with 
PBAC recommendation. 
All licensed drugs except 
“lifestyle” drugs are in principle 
covered by the statutory 
health insurance funds. 
All licensed drugs are in 
principle covered by the 
NHS. 
Explicit exceptions 
to listing/coverage 
mechanism 
Herceptin Program
Life Saving Drugs Program
N/A Exceptional panels operate 
at the local trust level. End-
of-life NICE guidance for 
more generous threshold 
for drugs extending life 
for terminally ill patients. 
Cancer Drugs Fund for 
cancer drugs considered 
and rejected by NICE.
* 2011 OECD Health Data, http://www.oecd.org/document/16/0,3746,en_2649_34631_2085200_1_1_1_1,00.html.
** AUD1 = USD1.03368 as at April 1, 2011. From http://www.oanda.com.
Source: Authors’ analysis.
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•	 There is increasing support for accelerating pro-
cesses for new drugs coming to the market, with 
payers working with pharmaceutical companies 
to ensure products are appropriately priced and 
the risks of early adoption shared, through patient 
access scheme arrangements that may require 
manufacturers to generate and analyze new evi-
dence on comparative clinical and cost-effective-
ness as these drugs are used in a real-world setting.
The United States is also starting to struggle with 
questions of access and sustainability. For end-of-life or 
expensive oncology drugs, the experiences of the United 
Kingdom and Australia raise questions that the U.S. and 
other health care systems may wish to consider as they 
push reform plans forward:
•	 Is it legitimate to single out certain conditions, 
which weigh more in terms of the value soci-
ety places on them and therefore attract more 
resources relative to less “important” conditions?
•	 Who decides what is “important” and what would 
have to be displaced in terms of services and 
technologies in order to accommodate these high-
priority conditions?
•	 How should the evaluation and funding of such 
technologies differ from other categories of drugs 
and treatments? Should the standards of evidence 
be lower? And what impact would such a policy 
have on the drive to generate good-quality evi-
dence in the medium and long term?
•	 What are the implications for research and devel-
opment and for encouraging the development of 
high-impact technologies when technologies that 
have limited health impact are rewarded more 
highly than others that deliver a greater degree of 
health improvement?
•	 What are the roles of patient and disease-specific 
advocacy groups and public and media buy-in in 
developing and implementing these policies?
The United States, Western Europe, and Australia 
may have different underlying principles when it comes 
to health care, but they are faced with similar problems  
of rising costs, inequities of access resulting in inef-
ficiencies, burgeoning spending, and varied efforts by 
policymakers to manage these tensions. In the U.S., 
there are no explicit nationwide coverage decisions that 
are enforceable across public and private providers. And 
while public-payer spending grew six times faster in 2009 
than did private health insurance (and is due to exceed 
the latter by 201258), it is unlikely that a nationwide 
coverage decision mechanism will be established in the 
foreseeable future. Nevertheless, there are at least three 
themes from Europe and Australia that U.S. policymak-
ers may find useful:
•	 The relevance of evidence in making decisions. 
Whatever the payment system and however frag-
mented it may be compared with other countries, 
there must be a legal, political, and institutional 
framework that encourages the use of evidence in 
making decisions on what to include in public or 
private benefit packages. The establishment of the 
Patient-Centered Outcomes Research Institute 
is a step in the right direction. Its work, coupled 
with appropriate incentives (monetary, regulatory, 
reputational, and other) may speed the diffusion 
and uptake of published data, and have an impact 
on outcomes and costs.
•	 The importance of price negotiations and risk-
sharing arrangements in ensuring broader access, 
value-for-money, cost control, and financial 
sustainability (e.g., through affordable insur-
ance premiums and healthy tax rates). Medicare’s 
Independent Payment Advisory Board may 
serve as a valuable lever, especially if it is allowed 
to discuss prices with the product developers, 
based on evidence of effectiveness pertinent to 
Medicare’s population. Such a process, if con-
ducted transparently, may also serve as an incen-
tive for industry to generate evidence of value 
through commercially sponsored comparative 
effectiveness research. Indeed, the experience of 
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the U.K.’s NHS with risk-sharing—though not 
without problems—shows that early engagement 
with industry can trigger not only price reductions 
but also a discussion of the evidentiary require-
ments and of ways of addressing these as products 
are adopted. For such discussions between payers 
and developers to have a greater impact, they may 
need to take place earlier in the developmental 
cycle of products, before licensing, and with input 
from the regulators. Such discussions are already 
occurring on a very limited basis in Australia, with 
a series of meetings between the manufacturer, the 
regulator, and the funder before commencement 
of Phase III trials. The focus of these discussions is 
not on pricing issues but on determining the best 
ways to address the evidentiary needs of both the 
regulator and the funder efficiently. Similarly, in 
the United Kingdom, NICE has been running a 
scientific advice program over the past three years, 
with similar objectives. 
•	 The role of open public debate and engagement 
with all stakeholders to discuss values, evidence, 
methods and processes for making unavoidable 
prioritization decisions. Politicians and govern-
ment, as well as industry representatives and 
professionals, must be honest about the issues and 
engage in dialogue rather than dismissing attempts 
to rationalize spending as “rationing,” “death 
panels,” or “socialized medicine.” Misinformation 
about single-payer systems and the use of health 
technology assessment in decision-making is 
distracting and polarizing. In most industrial-
ized countries, as well as in a growing number of 
emerging markets, industry, payers, professionals, 
and patients have come together to discuss the dif-
ficult issue of health care priority-setting.
Politics is about compromise, and prioritization 
decisions cannot and should not be determined solely 
by scientific calculations. Judgments must be made. The 
choice facing all countries, including the United States,  
is between making such judgments in a transparent, 
rational and inclusive way, offering the chance to be 
heard to all those affected by them, or making them 
covertly, where neither the scientific nor the social val-
ues applied can be understood or challenged. There is a 
third, even less constructive option of pretending that 
such judgments do not need to be made at all. The U.S. 
must find a way to move past its profound reluctance to 
“systematically deny access to expensive treatments that 
extend life by only a few weeks . . . [and recognize that] 
the morality of refusing to make deliberated choices is 
itself questionable.”59
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